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  Although still in the early stages, evidence from Latin America shows that there have 
been significant efforts to measure the effectiveness of programs closely linked to pub-
lic development banks (PDBs) and of PDBs themselves.
  Sound impact evaluations require a clear definition of the impact indicators to measure, 
access to a full and reliable database, selecting the best methodological approach in ac-
cordance with the questions and the available data, and having the necessary financial 
and human resources.
WhICh EVALUATIoNS ARE PERTINENT?
PDB programs have become a fundamental ingredient of productive development policy strategies in 
most emerging economies. Although the overall need for these interventions is rarely questioned, aca-
demics and policymakers often debate their effectiveness, as well as the optimal approaches and instru-
ments necessary to implement them. Therefore, the need to produce rigorous evaluations of PDBs has 
become increasingly relevant for both government and civil society (see Chapter 2).
This chapter presents the main concepts and operational arguments regarding the execution of in-
depth impact evaluations of PDB initiatives and instruments. For a more practical approach, these argu-
ments are presented with examples of such evaluations, which have either ended or are ongoing, as well 
as of other programs that relate to their activities. This, however, limits the scope of this chapter.
First, only one key aspect of the evaluation process is included: the attribution of effects. This sug-
gests that all the methods and techniques covered address the fundamental problem of identifying the 
causal relationship between public policy intervention and the observed changes in the study’s target 
population. Other important elements relating to a comprehensive evaluation process—such as efficien-
cy, relevance, and institutional coherence—fall beyond the scope of this analysis.
Second, only quantitative approaches are included, in order to solve the problem of attribution. 
This does not, in any way, imply that the contribution made by the qualitative approaches to the study 
of PDBs is not appreciated. On the contrary, quantitative and qualitative approaches are complementa-
ry, but much more exhaustive studies are required to include both. This chapter focuses mainly on the 
methodological literature based on counterfactual analysis, which stems from applying experimental 
and quasi-experimental methods to the evaluation of public policy.
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Interventions that are applicable to a PDB can cover a wider range of sectors than can be dealt with 
in one chapter alone. Therefore, the analysis and discussion in this chapter is restricted to those PDB ini-
tiatives that improve access to credit for the productive sector (business and agriculture). As such, it is 
possible to discuss more specific ideas and suggestions, while acknowledging that the complexity and 
characteristics of PDB programs call for more specific studies.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. It begins with a section posing the most important 
questions that are (or should be) included in any study of PDB effectiveness. The following section will 
identify the most commonly used indicators in these studies and the potential sources of information 
needed to establish such indicators. Later, the chapter analyzes the methods to respond to important 
questions relating to an evaluation, thus ensuring that the effects are correctly attributed. The final sec-
tion explores the resources required to carry out a rigorous PDB evaluation.
AN EFFICIENT EVALUATIoN: ESSENTIAL QUESTIoNS
One of the first issues to determine prior to conducting a PDB impact evaluation relates to the evalua-
tion’s principal objectives. These can be divided into two basic groups: (i) those that relate to the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) and (ii) those that relate to an analysis of the program’s secondary 
effects. The majority of analyses of the effectiveness of PDB programs seeks answers in terms of the ATT; 
for example, an analysis of the impact of the creation of a credit line on the quality of access to credit—or 
on the performance of the beneficiary businesses—should focus on the ATT.
Once a careful selection of the apparent outcomes and their indicators has been made, an evalua-
tion of the impact of PDB programs is not a trivial task, especially in terms of measuring the causal impact 
that these programs have on expected outcomes. The definition of causality in any impact evaluation 
is based on counterfactual analysis; in other words, what would have happened if the program had not 
existed? For example, if a business receives a subsidized loan or a specific line of credit, and the value of 
a certain outcome is observed (credit quality, performance, etc.), the public subsidy will have a causal im-
pact when it can be demonstrated that, in its absence (all other factors being equal), the outcome would 
have been different.
Although this is a relatively simple and inherent definition of causality, it does present an impor-
tant empirical complication: by definition, the counterfactual result can never be observed. In other 
words, if a firm receives a subsidy, it becomes impossible to determine what outcomes that firm might 
have achieved without the subsidy, or vice versa. Holland (1986) refers to the impossibility of observ-
ing a determined unit concurrently with and without treatment as the “fundamental problem of caus-
al inference.”
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The challenge of defining an adequate counterfactual cannot be resolved based solely on an indi-
vidual observation (in other words, it is impossible to generate a counterfactual for a specific beneficiary 
of a public intervention). However, it can be resolved efficiently in terms of the average values of a com-
bination of beneficiaries.1 Impact evaluations, therefore, focus on calculating the average, rather than the 
individual, effect of the treatment.
It is possible to estimate this average effect in various ways. The parameter for the widest scope is 
the average impact of the treatment on the population, as a whole: Average Treatment Effect (ATE). Cal-
culating the ATE involves constructing two counterfactuals (and, therefore, measuring two parameters): 
first, the counterfactual of what would have been the outcome for beneficiaries if they had not been 
beneficiaries (the ATT) and, second, the counterfactual of what would have been the outcome for the 
nonbeneficiaries if they had, in fact, been beneficiaries (also known as the Average Treatment Effect on 
the Untreated, or ATU).
These parameters will be biased in any study that does not incorporate the random assignment of 
beneficiaries (see Appendix 3.1). In all other cases, econometric techniques should be applied to eliminate 
biases and accurately calculate the program’s average impact.
Although both ATE and ATT are extremely important for evaluating the effectiveness of an inter-
vention, a well-designed evaluation can provide additional information to aid in the analysis of this effec-
tiveness, and derive adequate conclusions that contribute toward a successful policy design. One should 
consider the following aspects in the design of an evaluation.
EXTERNALITIES
When a program is implemented, a producer or a business can experience varying types of external-
ities or indirect effects. For example, the fact that a business receives a loan according to a PDB poli-
cy could mean that it will undergo changes in its production chain that will augment its productivity, 
which could, in turn, affect other neighboring firms, or those with which it is linked. These other firms 
may be either geographically close or linked through the production process, in which case they can 
be considered as indirect beneficiaries. In principle, a distinction can be drawn between the monetary 
and nonmonetary effects of externalities. For example, monetary effects could be those related to cost 
reductions in the production chain, whereas nonmonetary effects could be changes in actual produc-
tion technique.
1 See Appendix 3.1 for an analysis of this subject.
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Economies of agglomeration may even arise, which can result from a combination of positive ex-
ternalities occurring simultaneously, specific to an industry or location. For example, in a PDB program, 
beneficiary enterprises could take advantage of economies of agglomeration and enhance their perfor-
mance through information flow and new technologies, generated by both formal and informal links 
between enterprises and organizations. In turn, these effects could generate negative and positive ex-
ternalities and/or general equilibrium effects. Therefore, these aspects should be considered within the 
evaluation; otherwise the overall impact of the PDB programs could be misinterpreted.
Distribution of Effects over Time
It is possible that the effects of certain PDB programs, such as economic performance, take time to reveal 
themselves. In fact, the process of incorporating new credit, recruiting adequate staff, and organizing the 
business will delay the effect on economic performance.
These time lags can vary, according to the economic performance indicator selected. For exam-
ple, an intervention could generate a  temporary increase in results, or it could have significant im-
pacts that would dissipate progressively over time. Alternatively, the program’s impact may become 
apparent only after a determined period, or there could be an initial decrease in results, but later an 
improvement.
Therefore, a PDB program impact evaluation should contain an adequate idea of the distribution of 
the effects on beneficiary enterprises over time. A distinction should be clearly made between the short-, 
medium-, and long-term effects, in order to adequately evaluate the costs and benefits of a public pro-
gram. In fact, focusing only on a brief period after an intervention could lead to an underestimation of the 
impacts in the event that the program’s effects take several years to be recognized. On the other hand, 
evaluations that only take into account periods following implementation of the intervention could re-
sult in an underestimation of costs, should an adjustment process take place during the initial few years.
Intensity of Treatment and Dosage Effects
Literature relating to impact evaluations generally analyzes the binary case of participation versus the lack 
of participation in a determined program. In practice, units may often differ, not just according to their bi-
nary treatment status (participants versus nonparticipants), but also according to treatment intensity. For 
example, enterprises may receive different amounts of financing from a PDB loan program, or they may 
participate by taking out loans at varying times. This highlights the important aspects that need to be 
kept in mind during the evaluation design. It is useful to recognize whether participants perform better 
than nonparticipants, as well as how different degrees of treatment intensity influence performance, and 
whether it is possible to locate an “optimal level” for intervention (e.g., the amount of financing that max-
imizes the effects on corporate performance).
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Multiple Treatments
In contexts of multiple treatments, the evaluator may be interested not only in the individual effects of 
each treatment, but also in the effects generated by their interactions. It is far from clear whether the ef-
fect of multiple programs is always cumulative. However, research indicates that combining different in-
terventions can produce multiplicative effects, but also that the effects of one treatment can sometimes 
cancel the effects of another (e.g., when enterprises take investment loans from a public bank and, at the 
same time, a subsidy for innovation is granted by a funding program). Investigating the combined effect 
of different types of interventions is crucial to effective PDB program design.
Heterogeneity of the Impact
In most contexts, it is hard to assume that a certain intervention will have a constant effect on all of the 
units reviewed. In particular, two main types of impact heterogeneity can emerge. The first occurs when 
the interventions have varying effects on different groups (e.g., when the effect of a PDB credit is stron-
ger in those businesses that would otherwise be experiencing liquidity constraints). The second relates to 
distribution of the effects of the program throughout the population; for example, two programs might 
have the same average effect, but the effects of one could be concentrated in the lower half of the dis-
tribution (Frölich and Melly, 2009).2
INDICAToRS AND DATA
Indicators
Various indicators can be used to evaluate the impact of PDB programs on business performance.3 These 
include productivity, innovation, and employment, as well as others that relate to exports.
Productivity
There are various ways to measure productivity in an enterprise. The term may refer to the productivity 
of an input (e.g., labor productivity) or to the productivity of all inputs (i.e., the total factor productivity, 
2 Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) list other parameters that might be of interest to the evaluator: (i) the percentage of per-
sons that accept the program and benefit from it, (ii) the percentage of the total population that benefits from the program, (iii) 
certain impact distribution quantiles, and (iv) the distribution of gains to certain base state values. In these contexts, restricting 
the analysis to the average impact on the overall population (or on the treated population) might lead to an inaccurate, or at 
least incomplete, evaluation of the program’s effects.
3 As Gertler et al. (2011) reveal, the foremost indicators should be Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realistic, and Targeted 
(SMART).
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or TFP). Special caution must be taken when measuring labor productivity, which is expressed as the ra-
tio between total production and the work factor.4 In practice, enterprises produce diverse goods, and 
these have to be aggregated in a single measurement of production (e.g., sales or added value). General-
ly, there is information available regarding the number of employees and the labor costs, despite the fact 
that nominal variables should be qualified to obtain true variables.
With regard to TFP, the various methods of calculation make assumptions about the production pro-
cess and market competitiveness. Each method, therefore, has its strengths and weaknesses.5
Given the difficulty of observing this variable, many PDB programs are designed to directly address 
the improvement of diverse related variables that are easier to observe, such as, for example, the value of 
exports, research and development (R&D) costs, innovation, total sales, and employment levels.
Export-related indicators
In some cases, PDB programs can focus on promoting the exports of beneficiary firms. In order to mea-
sure the effects of these kinds of programs, different indicators can be used, including the value of ex-
ports, the probability that a firm becomes an exporter, the number of goods exported, and the number 
of export markets.
Some impact evaluations in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region use these indicators. 
For example, using the database that includes enterprises in Peru, throughout the period 2001–05, 
Volpe and Carballo (2008) find a relationship between the initiatives for promoting and for increasing 
exports, both in terms of markets and products. Likewise, according to a combination of corporate 
data covering the period 1996–2008, Castillo et al. (2011) observe that Argentina’s Business Restructur-
ing Program (Programa de Apoyo a la Reestructuración Empresarial, or PRE), which aims to strength-
en the small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), does enhance the chances of a firm becoming an 
exporter.
Innovation-related indicators
PDB programs can aim to correct market gaps by promoting investment by enterprises into R&D.6 Instru-
ments used to tackle this problem—as well as financial limitations on innovation—include public sub-
sidies (through support and nonreturnable grants), specific credits, tax incentives, and tools related to 
4 Ideally, these should be measured as the quantity of goods produced and the number of hours worked to produce those 
goods, respectively.
5 For studies relating to the estimation of productivity at the enterprise or establishment level, see Hulten (2001), Bartelsman and 
Doms (2000), and Van Biesebroeck (2009).
6 With regard to the innovative initiatives, market gaps can arise due to the difficulty of the private sector to appropriate the 
social returns arising from such initiatives.
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intellectual property. According to the nature of the impact to be measured, examples of these indica-
tors include total spending on R&D, performance, and the number of patents granted.
Employment-related indicators
Finally, a PDB program can increase employment in participating enterprises. This combination of indi-
cators could, therefore, include the number of employees, the type of employee in terms of qualification 
level, and the level of staff remuneration. For example, Castillo et al. (2011) presented evidence that the 
PRE program actually increased both the number of employees and the salaries.
Data
When evaluating the effectiveness of PDB programs, having access to high quality data can make all 
the difference. The data employed should be readily available, accurate, and reliable. One challenge 
that faces PDB program evaluations in the LAC region is that secondary data—in other words, data 
gathered for objectives other than evaluating a certain policy—is not usually available. Although sur-
veys and censuses do exist that could well provide ample information for evaluating and monitoring 
PDB programs, they are not always available for these purposes. This lack of availability also hinders pri-
mary data gathering.7
Secondary data
There are three sources of secondary data: surveys, censuses, and administrative registers. Each 
one of these sources has its advantages and disadvantages, which should be considered during an 
evaluation.
Surveys have the advantage of enabling a group of businesses to be established with annual infor-
mation. Furthermore, they provide information about different variables, enabling the evaluator to use 
matching methods to locate nonbeneficiaries with similar characteristics to the beneficiaries. However, 
the principal disadvantage of these surveys is that they include only samples of the population, and in 
many cases, these samples include only a small percentage of the beneficiaries.
Censuses, on the other hand, collect data concerning the total beneficiary population. Therefore, if 
the beneficiaries are active when the census is conducted, they will be included. Censuses tend to gath-
er more information than surveys, which becomes significant when applying the statistical technique of 
propensity score matching (PSM). The main disadvantage of censuses is that they are not conducted ev-
ery year.
7 For example, as will be further examined below, in order to define a sample of businesses, a list of all the firms in the region or 
the country should be available. If there is census data, the task becomes more difficult.
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Finally, administrative registers refer to a wide range of information about businesses, collected by 
various institutions for purposes other than evaluation. As with censuses and surveys, these databases 
can only be used within the institution that administers them, and only under a confidentiality agree-
ment. The main advantage of these administrative databases, compared to surveys and censuses, is that 
in most cases, they provide annual information regarding each and every business. However, the infor-
mation is limited and indicators, such as TFP, cannot always be expanded upon.
The administrative databases employed in the evaluations of productive development policies and 
PDB programs in the LAC region are the following: the Dynamic Analysis of Employment Database (Base 
de Datos para el Análisis Dinámico del Empleo, or BADE) in Argentina; the Annual Social Information Re-
port (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais, or RAIS) in Brazil; the Internal Revenue Service (Servicio de 
Impuestos Internos, or SII) in Chile; and Superfinanciera in Colombia.8 Castillo et al. (2011) consulted BADE 
in their evaluation of Argentina’s PRE program; and both Ribeiro and De Negri (2009) and De Negri et 
al. (2011) gathered data from RAIS for their evaluations of the loan policies of the National Bank of Social 
and Economic Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimiento Econômico y Social, or BNDES) and 
the PDB programs in Brazil, respectively. Finally, Arráiz, Henríquez, and Stucchi (2011) referred to the SII 
database for the evaluation of Chile’s Supplier Development Program (Programa de Desarrollo de Prov-
eedores).
Primary data
When there is no secondary data available, primary data should be collected. The main advantage of be-
ing able to collect primary data is that the questionnaire can be made to measure. The disadvantage is 
cost, as well as the fact that these data tend to cover only a short period of time.9 A sample questionnaire 
should be designed, together with an established plan of activities for the PDB program evaluations that 
require primary data.10
8 The Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory (Observatorio de Empleo y Dinámica Empresarial, or OEDE), part of 
Argentina’s Ministry of Work, Employment, and Social Security, created and administers BADE. Brazil’s Ministry of Work and Busi-
ness (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego, or MTE) administers RAIS. Colombia’s Financial Superintendance (Superintendencia Fi-
nanciera) maintains Superfinanciera’s database. Both access to, and use of, these databases are limited and regulated, according 
to regulations relating to statistical confidentiality, which are applied by respective administrative authorities.
9 While it is possible to obtain accounting data for businesses from previous years, this strategy may not be entirely effective 
since, sometimes, part of the information is not taken from accounting registers, or it is difficult to extract from old registers. 
Moreover, not all firms have adequate accounting systems, especially micro- and small enterprises.
10 Sample design is one of the most important activities in any study. In particular, the following elements (at least) should be 
addressed: (i) the unit of analysis and the strategy to define it, (ii) the selection strategy and the sample size, and (iii) the data-
gathering plan. As in most cases, a pilot test should be implemented before a base and monitoring survey can be initiated. 
Finally, all data-gathering exercises should have a schedule of activities (agreed by all the stakeholders involved), within which 
the dates for each activity, and the stakeholders responsible, are stipulated.
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METhoDoLoGICAL STANDARDS
The key element in any evaluation is to construct a credible counterfactual that accurately attributes the 
results of the policy intervention under evaluation. In particular, there are experimental and quasi-exper-
imental methods for evaluating PDB programs.
This section presents a general description of some of the most commonly applied methodologies. 
The first subsection examines the experimental design method, currently considered to be the “gold 
standard” for impact evaluations. Even in those cases in which a complete experimental design is not vi-
able, this often becomes the benchmark for comparison with other methods. In the second subsection, 
different quasi- and nonexperimental methods are discussed, which can be applied whenever an exper-
imental design is not viable.
The “Gold Standard”: Experimental Design
Impact evaluation literature describes the experimental design as being accorded a special status. This 
type of design is based on randomly dividing a representative sample into a treatment group and a con-
trol group. This ensures that there is equilibrium between the treated and untreated units with regard to 
the average observable and unobservable characteristics. The groups thus become comparable and the 
selection bias can be eliminated.11
Apart from their proven efficacy in solving the problem of the missing counterfactual, experimental 
designs have other practical advantages. First, randomization allows the average impact of a program to 
be calculated as a simple difference in means between the treated and control groups, without recourse 
to the sophisticated econometric techniques necessary in nonexperimental contexts to allow for differ-
ent types of bias.
Second, randomization can reduce data requirements vis-à-vis other nonexperimental techniques, 
due to the estimation of the average program impact. This random assignment only requires the post-
treatment outcomes for each group, as well as a handful of ex-ante characteristics, to verify that random-
ization has been successful.
Of course, this does not imply that an efficient database is not an essential requirement for experimen-
tal evaluations; the more data available, the more accurate and encompassing the evaluation. For example, 
gathering data for many years after treatment can help establish a program’s long-term effects. Likewise, 
a good supply of pretreatment outcome data, variables, and other observable factors can significantly im-
prove the accuracy of the estimated impacts, which is of key concern in studies with small sample sizes.
11 Consequently, it is possible to solve the fundamental problem of casual inference by using a randomly selected control group 
to calculate the counterfactual result of the treatment group.
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Although randomization is becoming the widespread approach for evaluating the impact of public 
policy in sectors, such as development and labor economics (see, for example, Banerjee and Duflo, 2009), 
it has yet to be applied to the evaluation of PDB programs. One possible explanation is that it is unlikely 
that these programs fulfill the criteria (i.e., excess demand) that make a random assignment possible.12 In 
general, randomized experiments for evaluating public intervention take advantage of high demand for 
these services and of supply-side limitations. Under these circumstances, an arbitrary selection of benefi-
ciaries from a pool of possible candidates is a clear and transparent method of guaranteeing that all units 
(individuals, businesses, etc.) have the same opportunity to participate.
Banerjee and Duflo (2004) present an experimental design for PDB programs. The authors make use 
of an exogenous variation, generated by a policy change in India, to establish whether or not the enter-
prises that received direct credits increased their production. The results showed a significant accelera-
tion in the growth rate of sales and profits among the beneficiary enterprises. Another example by Cotler 
and Woodruff (2008), applies the differences established in the introduction of a new loans program, de-
signed to serve the clients of the largest fast-food company in Mexico (Bimbo). This is done to identify 
the impact of credit on the results of small retailing firms in Mexico City. The authors discovered that the 
loans positively impacted the smaller firms, and negatively the larger ones. They claim that these out-
comes are consistent with their hypothesis—that smaller enterprises experience greater capital returns 
and face greater credit constraints.
Quasi- and Nonexperimental Methods
In the absence of a random assignment, the preexisting differences between program participants and 
nonparticipants can generate biases that severely hamper the estimation of the programs impact. Selec-
tion bias is of significant concern, due to two possible sources. First, there could be an administrative bias 
(or program placement bias), which occurs when program administrators select participants on the ba-
sis of specific criteria that differentiate them from nonparticipants. Second, there could be a case of self-
selection, which occurs when individuals have agreed whether or not to participate, according to a type 
of cost–benefit analysis that, again, could lead to significant differences between the pool of participants 
and nonparticipants.
12 It is worth highlighting that excess demand is not a necessary condition for applying an experimental design. In effect, ran-
domization is compatible with treating the entire eligible population. For example, randomization is normally used to divide the 
eligible individuals into different groups, and to arbitrarily assign the order in which they receive treatment, instead of whether 
or not they actually receive it. This will enable the aggregations, which are treated later, to be used as control groups for those 
aggregations that were treated earlier. However, certain program characteristics, such as the type of project and the number of 
applicants, might mean that this type of randomization might not be politically or ethically feasible in some cases, while there 
remains the need to carry out an impact evaluation. Fortunately, there are numerous nonexperimental techniques that have 
been created to rep e random assignation as a way of estimating the impact of public programs.
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In practice, it is highly likely that there will be a combination of both selection biases: in general, all 
public interventions have a target population, such as SMEs, young researchers willing to study abroad, or 
farmers willing to introduce new technologies. Within this target population, individuals or enterprises can 
decide whether to participate or not. Consequently, a simple preexisting difference in the values between 
the treated and untreated groups can affect the estimation of program impact and make it inaccurate.
To address this problem, an initial attempt to control the factors that generate selection bias should 
be made. A few adopted techniques include the following: regression methods, propensity score match-
ing (PSM), difference-in-differences (DD) methods, and fixed effects (FE) methods. A second approach, rep-
resented by Instrumental Variables (IV) and the Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, consists of analyzing 
the specific characteristics of the assignment principles, in order to reproduce the experimental setting.
Regression methods and propensity score matching
As previously mentioned, impact can be calculated as the difference in value between the treated and 
the untreated groups, within an experimental design program. In turn, this can be equivalent to running 
a linear regression of the outcome of interest against a constant and a binary variable that indicates the 
treatment status (treated/untreated). In nonexperimental settings, this regression becomes inadequate, 
due to the biases previously referred to. However, if all the variables affecting both the treatment status 
and the outcomes are obvious, it becomes possible to implement control by adding these variables to 
the linear regression.13
To understand how Propensity Score Matching (PSM) works, suppose that treated and untreated in-
dividuals only differ by a single variable, X. Thereafter, the matching estimator assigns a unit of compar-
ison to each treated individual with an untreated individual that has the most similar value to X. In this 
case, the effect of the treatment can be calculated as an average of the differences between the treated 
units and these units’ nearest untreated neighbors in terms of their values of X.14
Currently, PSM appears to be the preferred approach in the evaluation of PDBs. For instance, Aiva-
zian, Mazumdar, and Santor (2003) conclude that the World Bank’s Small and Medium Scale Industry 
Program in Sri Lanka has contributed to reducing credit constraints and increasing investment levels in 
the enterprises that have received subsidies. However, this effect has been rather limited due, to a large 
13 The key assumption here is one that can control, explicitly, for all relevant variables, usually referred to as Conditional Indepen-
dence Assumption (CIA) or Selection on Observables.
14 However, when various factors differ between the groups, the idea of closeness is not clearly defined, given that individuals 
might be similar in some aspects and different in others. To overcome this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
show that, if all the relevant factors that determine program participation are known, the matching approach between treated 
and untreated individuals can be conducted. This is based on the conditional probability of participation or the propensity 
score, which represents the probability of participating in the program for a given value of the vector of characteristics X.
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extent, to the relatively small quantity of resources employed for this purpose. Another conclusion aris-
ing from the mentioned analysis is that a public guarantee considerably lowers the cost of loans for SMEs.
Difference-in-differences and fixed effects models
DD models arise in the context of “natural experiments.” In other words, they arise in situations in which 
treatment and control groups exist, but a researcher does not design them—rather they appear natural-
ly. Studies often use these models to evaluate the impact of aggregate-level policy changes.15
The DD model consists of the application of a double difference. It compares the changes over time 
in the variable of interest (such as sales or productivity) between a beneficiary population of a program 
(treated group) and a nonbeneficiary population (comparison group).16
The identification assumption, which determines the DD and FE models, is that there are no unob-
served factors that vary over time, nor are there any that affect the status of the treatment or outcome. 
In other words, relevant unobserved factors remain constant over time. Therefore, DD and FE models re-
quire that, in the absence of a treatment, it is assumed that the two groups (treated and control) would 
have the same trends.
The most commonly used approach is to apply the DD method to the databases, combined with 
PSM, in order to ensure a similarity between participants and nonparticipants. This approach works as 
follows: when there is available data for the years prior to the program, it is possible to apply PSM to es-
tablish nonbeneficiaries with the same ex-ante trends as beneficiaries in the outcome variables. When 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries with the same characteristics are compared prior to program imple-
mentation, including the trends in the outcome variables, it is easier to assume the equilibrium of trends 
in the absence of the program. Thus, the combination of DD and PSM is a powerful procedure for obtain-
ing effective impact estimations of PDB programs.17
For example, Zecchini and Ventura (2006), apply a DD approach to show that public guarantee funds 
for SMEs, in Italy, increased the credit that these enterprises received from the banking system. Based on 
15 For example, one of the most cited papers that applied this technique is that by Card and Krueger (1994), in which a change 
of legislation in New Jersey was analyzed to assess the impact of minimum salaries on employment, using Pennsylvania as a 
comparison group.
16 This method can easily be extended to multiple groups and time periods, as well as to include control variables (e.g., Imbens 
and Wooldridge, 2009). Furthermore, the DD estimator can be adapted to cases in which the treatment is assigned at the indi-
vidual level; this will overcome one of the most significant drawbacks of regressive and matching estimators, given that it allows 
for the control of selecting the unobserved factors, as long as they are constant over time. Thus, the DD method is an example 
of a fixed-effect (FE) estimator, which assumes that any unobserved heterogeneity that influences program participation and 
outcomes is fixed throughout the recorded period.
17 This procedure comprises three stages: (i) calculate the pretreatment propensity score, (ii) define a common base for business-
es through matching, and (iii) utilize a fixed effects model on this base. Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vázquez (2010) present directives 
for the application of this method, and various authors have carried out evaluations, based on its application.
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this result, the authors conclude that, due to the relatively low cost and the State’s high capacity to mobi-
lize private capital, guarantee schemes are an effective instruments for promoting SME financing, as long 
as the focus is placed on those enterprises with the most significant financial constraints.
Also applying a  DD methodology, Paravisini (2008) analyzes the effect of a  loan program, using 
World Bank funding, for small Argentine enterprises. He observed that 93 cents out of every dollar invest-
ed would have reached the businesses in any case. This outcome suggests that banks implement pro-
grams targeting defined beneficiaries to reduce the cost of loans, without substantially increasing the 
amount of loans approved.
Finally, Bach (2011) demonstrates that the French loan program, the Industrial Development Savings 
Account (Compte pour le Développement Industriel, or COVEDI), does improve credit flow to small enter-
prises in France. The findings reveal that access to subsidies considerably augment the financing of loans 
to businesses. However, Bach concludes that this does not lead to a significant substitution between the 
subsidized and unsubsidized financing channels, which could be interpreted as financial constraints.
Furthermore, Hall and Maffioli (2008) present a summary of the empirical evaluations in Latin Amer-
ica. Their study reveals that credit programs usually have positive effects on intermediate outcomes, 
such as when allocating funds for R&D, vocational training, and the introduction of new quality control 
processes and procedures, especially in developing countries (López Acevedo and Tan, 2010). However, 
evidence of any impact on performance outcomes over the longer term, such as on sales, exports, em-
ployment, labor productivity, or PTF, varies.
As an example, Chudnovsky et al. (2010) analyze Argentina’s Technological Fund (Fondo Tecnológi-
co Argentino, or FONTAR), a program designed to improve R&D and technological development through 
nonreturnable payments. Although the authors establish positive effects that range from a 57 percent to 
a 79 percent increase in investment in innovation, they find no relevant impact on labor productivity or 
in sales of new products. Similarly, with regard to Brazil’s National Technological Enterprise Development 
Support (Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Tecnológico da Empresa, or ADTE), a program of subsidies for R&D 
and technological development, Ribeiro and De Negri (2009) observe an increase of between 50 percent 
and 90 percent in R&D expenditure, but they find little impact on sales, employment, or labor productiv-
ity. Benavente, Crespi, and Maffioli (2007) examine Chile’s National Fund for Technological and Productive 
Development (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Tecnológico y Productivo, or FONTEC), which is designed 
to promote the transfer and development of technologies and to support R&D. The authors calculate an 
estimated 40 percent increase in sales and a 3 percent increase in export concentration, but they do not 
find an impact on labor productivity.
Other examples, which are closely related to PDB programs targeting Latin America, are those ex-
amined by Ribeiro and De Negri (2009), De Negri et al. (2011), and Eslava, Maffioli, and Meléndez Arjona 
(2012a and 2012b). For example, De Negri et al. (2011) analyze the effectiveness of public credit lines to 
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boost performance in Brazilian enterprises. The authors focus on the impact of credit lines, administered 
by BNDES and by the Brazilian Innovation Agency (Agencia Brasileña de Innovación), on the growth in 
employment, labor productivity, and exports. They apply a combination of panel data, developed by the 
Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica, or IPEA), which gathers infor-
mation about performance at the firm level and access to credit lines. This particular data setting allows 
them to apply quasi-experimental techniques to control selection biases when calculating the impact 
of access to public credit. The basis of their calculation includes a DD strategy, which they complement 
with matching methods in order to verify impact robustness. The results consistently demonstrate that 
access to public credit lines does have a significantly positive impact on growth in employment and ex-
ports. Additionally, they do not detect significant effects on productivity. It is interesting to note from the 
conclusions that the impact on exports is owed, primarily, to an increase in the volume of exports by ex-
porting firms; however, there is no significant effect detected regarding the firms’ themselves becoming 
possible exporters.
Eslava, Maffioli, and Meléndez Arjona (2012a) analyze the impact of lending activity on business 
performance in Colombia’s Business Development Bank (Banco de Desarrollo Empresarial, or BANCOL-
DEX). The use data, gathered over several years, to evaluate the loans made by BANCOLDEX and the per-
formance of manufacturing establishments with 10 or more employees. According to a combination of 
matching techniques and fixed-effect panel regressions to address the selection biases, they find sig-
nificant increases in production (24 percent), employment (11 percent), investments (70 percent), and 
productivity (approximately 10 percent) over the four years following the first BANCOLDEX loan. Howev-
er, the impact on investments, production, and productivity is derived, primarily, from long-term loans 
made by BANCOLDEX.
Similarly, Eslava, Maffioli, and Meléndez Arjona (2012b) examine the impact of BANCOLDEX on ac-
cess to credit. For this purpose, they use a database containing key characteristics of all the loans admin-
istered to enterprises in Colombia, including data relating to the financial intermediary, through which 
the loan was arranged, and whether or not it was financed by BANCOLDEX. The authors compare BAN-
COLDEX loans with loans from other sources, and they study the impact of receiving a BANCOLDEX 
loan, based on the prior credit history of an enterprise. To address the problem of selection bias, they 
apply a combination of controlled models using fixed effects and matching techniques. The conclusions 
demonstrate that the credit terms relating to BANCOLDEX loans are characterized by lower-than-aver-
age interest rates, larger-than-average amounts loaned, and longer-than-average payment terms. How-
ever, the effect of the longer-than-average payment term could take up to two years before it can be 
observed. Finally, the conclusions present a demonstration effect: businesses with access to BANCOL-
DEX credit are capable of significantly expanding the number of intermediaries with which they share 
credit relations.
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The instrumental variables approach
The institutional variables (IV) approach consists of exploiting certain features of the design and institu-
tional setting of a program in order to find the source of an exogenous variation that best reproduces 
the conditions of a random trial. Although the theoretical aspects of the IV method may be complex, the 
perception is simple: it relates to establishing a variable that can influence the probability of participation, 
but that is not related to other variables that influence the outcome in any way. In other words, an instru-
mental variable (or, simply, an instrument) is a variable that influences the treatment status, but can also 
be considered to be “as good as random.”
To illustrate how this method works, suppose a PDB program seeks to increase the sales of benefi-
ciary firms in order to adopt new technologies that would enable them to access international markets. 
In this case, it can be anticipated that some unobserved factors that determine participation by business-
es in the program (e.g., entrepreneurs’ capacity and motivation) could also have some influence on sales 
capacity. In this context, a comparison between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries would not only reflect 
the project’s impact, but also the intrinsic characteristics of the participating firms.18
Although the IV method is an effective tool for evaluating the impact of PDB programs, it is not al-
ways easy to find an instrument once a project has been designed. In this case, an effective approach is to 
implement the project with a so-called “random stimulus,” an incentive that arbitrarily persuades firms to 
participate in the credit program through various mechanisms. For instance, flyers that are distributed to 
some firms can be a means of showing that a program can reduce the cost of credit. It is, thus, reasonable 
to believe that the firms that received the flyers are more likely to participate in the program compared 
with those that were not included in the distribution. Given that the incentive was randomly distributed, 
there is no reason to suppose that the promotion mechanism is correlated with the outcomes variable, 
which thereby makes it a reasonable instrument.19
Given the difficulties to identify effective instruments, most literature adopting this particular meth-
od has concentrated on doing so through random stimulus. One of the best known examples of this 
approach is presented in Karlan and Zinman (2008). These authors test the hypotheses of inelastic de-
mand for microcredits using data from a randomized field experiment carried out in South Africa. The 
data include information about previous borrowers from an important for-profit institution that provided 
18 For more details about the characteristics of the IV method and its limitations, see Angrist and Pischke (2009).
19 Another limitation of the IV approach is that it can only estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), which means 
that its results are relevant only for those enterprises whose behavior is affected by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). 
For example, in the previous case, the results are valid only for those enterprises that participate in the program because of the 
reduced costs and that, if there were no discount, would not participate. However, the results are not valid for the enterprises 
that do exploit the discount, but would participate even if there were no discount. Furthermore, it is important to consider the 
problem of instrument weakness (e.g., Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995): when an instrument is weak, it can generate biases and 
increase the standard errors of the IV estimation.
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micro-consumer loans to poor workers. Karlan and Zinman first calculate the price elasticity of demand 
for consumer loans by offering, through mailing, a random interest rate to each one of the more than 
50,000 previous customers. Subsequently, they calculate the time period elasticity by, again, mailing with 
randomly assigned suggestions to draw a selection of certain time periods.
Although this type of design has not been fully implemented in the study of PDBs, it can be easily 
adapted. For example, the evaluation plan for a loan that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) re-
cently provided to a PDB in Mexico adopts a random stimulus design that includes a random assignment 
of publicity campaigns concerning new financial products in a given region. Similarly, a project in Ecua-
dor, supported by the IDB, intends to randomize information about the availability of a line of credit to 
the passive clients of microcredit institutions, the latter relating to the national Tier 2 microcredit fund. In 
both cases, if the publicity campaigns prove sufficiently effective to influence the acceptance of lines of 
credit, they could be used as a powerful IV approach for the evaluations of these lines of credit.
Regression discontinuity
Regression discontinuity (RD) is another powerful approach for identifying the impact of a PDB program 
on firm performance. It is based on the idea that, in a world highly governed by regulation, some of these 
regulations are arbitrary and, thus, provide natural experiments. In this framework, the approach mea-
sures the average effect of a treatment on the discontinuity that determines which enterprises are as-
signed to the treatment (receive the program) and which ones are assigned to the control group (do not 
receive the program). The perception behind this approach is that the treated units just above the cut-
off point are very similar to the control units just below it, which enable the results to be compared with-
out incurring any bias. Regression discontinuity designs are presented in two forms: sharp and fuzzy. The 
former are based on a selection of observables, whereas the latter suggest the use of instrumental vari-
ables (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
A good example of a sharp regression discontinuity is a PDB program that provides lines of cred-
it for firms, according to their specific credit history: those that are found above the threshold can 
benefit from the program and those located below form part of the control group. This scheme has 
the advantage that the credit rating can be determined outside of the financial institution providing 
the loan, by a central authority or other entity, thereby enhancing the transparency of the selection 
process.
A fuzzy regression discontinuity differs from a sharp one in that there is no single value that perfectly 
determines the treatment and control groups. Rather, there is a variable that influences the probability of 
treatment. In this case, the variable that influences program participation can be used as an instrumental 
variable to predict the treatment. Since this type of regression discontinuity can be seen as a special ele-
ment within the IV model, its advantages and limitations are the same as the latter.
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For example, Bubb and Kaufman (2009) argue that investment banks in the United States adopt-
ed issuer selection rules (with cutoff points), based on credit ratings, in response to the Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac subscription directives. The authors offer a simple model that rationalizes this general rule 
of origin, and suggest that the increase in defaulted loans is not sufficient proof that securitization has 
led to lax screening. They analyze the data relating to the loans in detail and, based on a regression dis-
continuity design, they discover that the evidence is, on the one hand, inconsistent with the theory of 
the automatic securitization rule and, on the other hand, consistent with the theory of the automatic rule 
of origin. They also document an increase in the number of loans and in the rate of defaults at the cred-
it rating cutoff point, while there is no corresponding increase in the securitization rate. Finally, they con-
clude that the cutoff point rules, based on credit ratings, provide evidence that the major securitizers are, 
to a certain point, capable of modifying the behavior of the investment banks.
Furthermore, on the basis of a regression discontinuity framework, Skiba and Tobacman (2007) ben-
efit from a credit-rating process, used to approve or deny payday loan applications, in order to study the 
causal impact of access to these loans on payday loan uptake, bankruptcies, and misdemeanors. They 
present evidence that those employees who were approved for payday loans requested on average 8.8 
more payday loans, until their debt reached US$2,400 (with an additional US$350 in financing charges). 
Based on this evidence, it is unlikely that the behavior associated with payday loans is determined by tem-
porary shocks to consumer needs. Approval of these payday loans reduces the incidence of short-term 
collateral loans, but this reduction dissipates after a few weeks.
Structural models
When selecting the best empirical approach for analyzing economic data, it is key for an analyst to es-
tablish which questions need answers. Explicit economic models facilitate the formulation of economic 
questions. Defenders of nontheoretical approaches to analyzing economic data suggest randomization 
as a model, and invoke the IV, PSM, or regression discontinuity methods as substitutes for randomization. 
However, even perfectly executed randomizations fail to respond to all economic questions. There are 
clear examples that show that structural models generate more information on preferences than exper-
iments do.
Structural models seek to utilize data to define the parameters of an underlying economic model, 
based on individual choice models, or on the aggregate relationships deriving from them. Structural cal-
culus enjoys a long tradition in economics, but it is only recently that better and wider databases have 
become available, in parallel to more powerful computers, perfected modeling methods, faster com-
puting techniques, and new econometric models (e.g., those mentioned above), which have enabled 
significant progress. Based on a group of assumptions, these kinds of models permit the calculation of 
the contribution of a given policy change to the economy. The works of Todd and Wolpin (2006), Keane 
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and Wolpin (1997), and Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2010) present examples of this methodology, al-
though not necessarily applied to PDBs.
RESoURCES
To be comprehensive, an evaluation plan must clearly identify the resources needed for its execution, 
which include: (i) choosing the evaluation team and defining the respective responsibilities and tasks, 
(ii) setting the budget and the work plan, and (iii) identifying the source of financing.
The Evaluation Team
Ideally, a combination of external evaluators and expert managers should make up the evaluation team 
(in other words, professionals who are involved in implementing the program). The external evaluators 
guarantee both greater independence, because they are much more involved in the success of the evalu-
ation than in the success of the program (this way, a high degree of objectivity and credibility can be ob-
tained), and higher concentration, because they are exclusively dedicated to the evaluation, rather than 
to the implementation of the project.
The professionals involved in implementation are crucial to ensuring that (i) the program’s objectives 
and its execution mechanisms are clearly understood; (ii) there is easy and timely access to data and in-
formation about the project; and (iii) there is a fluid dialogue with the authorities and greater recognition 
for the results of the evaluation.
The evaluation plan must specify the capacities and technical knowledge required for a successful 
evaluation. Although it is difficult to generalize the exact composition of an ideal team (which depends 
on the program and the available resources), the team should, at least, be able to collectively offer knowl-
edge of (and experience in) the following:
1. Design of evaluations, including the evaluation method and interpretation of the statistical power.
2. Negotiation of the evaluation design with the main stakeholders.
3. Design and administration of data gathering, which ranges from designing the questionnaire, de-
veloping sample plans, and collecting information in contexts that are relevant to the project to be 
evaluated.20
20 If the project team decides to contract external individuals or firms to contribute to managing the impact evaluation, it would 
be useful to consider the evaluation and data gathering as two separate elements that can be executed, theoretically, by two 
separate individuals or agencies. For this model to succeed, the two individuals or agencies have to work cohesively, and it is 
recommended that the entity that solicits the evaluation play a role in its coordination.
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4. Design of systems to protect the integrity of the evaluation.
5. Review of the statistical analysis for estimating the impacts.
6. Presentation of the conclusions to a wide spectrum of audiences, including academics and policy-
makers.
Irrespective of the exact composition of the team, the management of the program and implemen-
tation of the evaluation are interrelated, and should not function as independent and separate activities.
Financial Resources
The evaluation plan should include a detailed calculation of the resources necessary to finance the evalu-
ation. Therefore, the design of the plan should include a work plan that describes who will carry out what 
activity, and when. It is recommended to allocate a budget to each activity, in order to accurately define 
the financing needs, mobilize resources, and ensure that available funding levels are adequate (Gorgens 
and Kusek, 2009). It is also important to distinguish the cost between monitoring and evaluation activi-
ties. Table 3.1 presents an example of a budget for an impact evaluation work plan.
A significant component related to the cost of any evaluation is the combination of resources need-
ed for data gathering. A recent study regarding World Bank impact evaluations concludes that more than 
half of the resources earmarked for an evaluation go toward data collection (see Gertler et al., 2011). The 
cost of compiling information depends on various factors. However, the two key factors are sample size 
and the number of data-gathering rounds. It is, therefore, essential to carefully consider these two factors 
during the early phases of evaluation design.
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CoNCLUSIoNS
To be successful, the design of an impact evaluation of a PDB program must incorporate the following 
key aspects. First, it must account for the externalities of the beneficiary firms, given that economies of 
scale can arise. Moreover, impacts of PDB programs can take some time before they become apparent. 
Therefore, for any impact evaluation, it is fundamental to establish the distribution of a program’s effects 
over time. Furthermore, it could be the case that firms take differing amounts of credit from the pro-
gram, or that they participate by taking out loans at different times. It is, thus, vital to consider treatment 
intensity and dosage effects. Finally, two additional elements should be considered for evaluating a PDB 
program: (i) the potential multiple treatments that arise, whenever a beneficiary firm accepts additional 
credit from other institutions in the market; and (ii) the heterogeneous nature of the impact, when there 
are varying effects for different beneficiary groups.
Second, in an analysis of the effectiveness of a PDB program, the use of quality data can make all 
the difference in the evaluation outcome. The data used should be available, accurate, and reliable. In this 
sense, the quality of the data, whether primary or secondary, is also an indispensable element for a suc-
cessful evaluation.
Finally, it is possible to apply different methodologies—both experimental and quasi-experimen-
tal—to the evaluation of PDB programs. As a general rule, an experimental methodology guarantees 
the quality of both the counterfactual and the outcomes. However, the general challenge is to select the 
methodology that best suits the particular circumstances of each program.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, despite the fact that the empirical evidence is still scarce, re-
searchers have begun to document the effectiveness of PDB-related programs. Those impact evaluations 
are based on rigorous methodologies and reliable data and, in general, seek to control for several of the 
previously mentioned relevant factors. However, a clear—but also stimulating—challenge remains in the 
future, given the wide variety of PDB programs and the methodologies currently available.
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APPENDIX 3.121
The idea of a counterfactual can be formalized using the Rubin Causal Model (RCM) (Holland, 1986), as 
follows: Y1 and Y0 denote the potential outcomes for an individual with and without treatment, respec-
tively. The result Y observed for an individual is Y1 if the individual is treated and Y0 if not. The binary vari-
able T shows the status of the treatment of the individuals, with T=1 for those that participate and T=0 for 
those that do not participate. The result can therefore be expressed as:
Y Y T Y T= − +0 11.( ) .
In this context, Y0 is the counterfactual outcome for the units treated and Y1 is the result for the un-
treated ones. The impact of the program for the individual I, which cannot be observed, is defined as the 
difference between the two potential outcomes:
δi i iY Y= −1 0
In general, impact evaluations focus on calculating the average effect of the treatment, rather than 
the individual effect. In practice, various “average effects” can be calculated.
First, the average treatment effect (ATE), which is the average impact of the treatment on the pop-
ulation as a whole:
ATE E E Y Y= = −( ) ( )δ 1 0
Second, the ATT is the average impact of the treatment on the treated population:
ATT E T E Y Y T= = = − =( | ) ( | )δ 1 11 0
Third, the average effect on the untreated (ATU) is the impact that the program would have had on 
the population that did not participate in the program:
ATU E T E Y Y T= = = − =( | ) ( | )δ 0 01 0
However, none of these parameters can be observed. For example, the ATT can be rewritten as:
21 This Appendix is based on Heinrich, Maffioli and Vázquez (2010).
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ATT E Y T E Y T= = − =( | ) ( | )1 01 1
where the second term is not observable, given that it measures the average result that the treated pop-
ulation would have obtained without treatment. One possibility is to exchange the second term for 
E Y T( | )0 0= , which is the average observed result for the untreated population. Therefore:
∆ = = − =E Y T E Y T( | ) ( | )1 01 0
∆ = = − = + = − =E Y T E Y T E Y T E Y T( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | )1 0 0 01 1 1 0
∆ = +ATT SB
Where the final term is usually called the selection bias (SB). This term reflects the difference in the coun-
terfactual between the individuals treated and the results observed in the untreated individuals. Unless 
the bias is zero (which is very unlikely in practice), econometric techniques will have to be used to cor-
rectly calculate the average impact of the program.
